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SUBLIMINAL RESPONSE PRIMING
The question whether or not stimuli that do not enter 
awareness influence behaviour has been explored for 
more than 100 years. For example, Sidis reported in 
1898 that subjects were able to guess numbers printed 
on distant cards with above-chance accuracy, in spite 
of their self-reported inability to make out what was 
printed. However, for a long time “proofs” of uncon-
scious manipulations of behaviour were criticized for 
methodological reasons and a lively debate about the 
standards for the investigation of unconscious manipu-
lation evolved (cf. Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 
1993). 
Only in the mid-nineties, Neumann & Klotz (1994; 
see also Klotz & Neumann, 1999) reported sublimi-
nal response priming (or masked priming) experi-
ments that convincingly demonstrated the impact of 
non-consciously presented stimuli on behaviour. In 
subliminal  response  priming  experiments,  partici-
pants are usually required to perform a forced choice 
reaction  time  task  with  two  response  alternatives 
according to a supraliminally presented target. Prior 
to the target another stimulus, the so-called prime, 
is presented subliminally. Reaction times are shorter 
if the prime elicits the same response as the target 
stimulus  to  which  participants  respond  (congruent 
prime). In contrast, reaction times are increased if 
the prime is incongruent, that is if it elicits a differ-
ent response than the target. [Under specific timing 
conditions and probably restricted to specific mask-
ABStRAct
Subliminal response priming has been consid-
ered to operate on several stages, e.g. percep-
tual, central or motor stages might be affected. 
While primes’ impact on target perception has 
been clearly demonstrated, semantic response 
priming  recently  has  been  thrown  into  doubt 
(e.g.  Klinger,  Burton,  &  Pitts,  2000).  Final-
ly,  LRP  studies  have  revealed  that  subliminal 
primes evoke motor processes. Yet, the prem-
ises  for  such  prime-evoked  motor  activation 
are not settled. A transfer of priming to stimuli 
that have never been presented as targets ap-
pears  particularly  interesting  because  it  sug-
gests  a  level  of  processing  that  goes  beyond 
a reactivation of previously acquired S-R links. 
Yet,  such  transfer  has  not  always  withstood 
empirical  testing.  to  account  for  these  con-
tradictory results, we proposed a two-process 
model (Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003): First, 
participants  build  up  expectations  regarding 
imperative stimuli for the required responses 
according  to  experience  and/or  instructions. 
Second, stimuli that match these “action trig-
gers” directly activate the corresponding mo-
tor  responses  irrespective  of  their  conscious 
identification. In line with these assumptions, 
recent studies revealed that non-target primes 
induce priming when they fit the current task 
intentions and when they are expected in the 
experimental setting.
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ing  conditions,  the  priming  effect  is  reversed,  i.e. 
primes assigned to the same response as the target 
then delay responding (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger, Jaśkowski, Aydemir, 
van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004)]. Thus, the prime has 
an impact on behaviour. To ensure that prime pres-
entation  is  indeed  subliminal,  presentation  time  is 
very short, 10 to 50 ms, and the primes are masked. 
Furthermore,  the  visibility  of  the  primes  is  tested 
separately. For this visibility test, prime, mask and 
target are presented exactly as in the experimental 
trials, but participants are requested to either iden-
tify or to discriminate the primes. If performance in 
the visibility test does not exceed chance level, the 
prime  is  considered  to  be  presented  subliminally, 
that is, unconsciously.
Thus, subliminal priming is characterized by the fol-
lowing dissociation: On the one hand, the prime causes 
a  congruency  effect,  that  is,  participants  respond 
faster to the target after congruent primes compared 
to incongruent ones. On the other hand, the prime is 
not seen in a visibility test; participants are not able 
to discriminate the primes or they do not identify the 
prime above chance.
In response priming the prime-target congruency 
results from overlap regarding the assigned motor re-
sponses and, of course, the stimulus features and proc-
esses used to assign the stimuli to these responses. In 
addition, other forms of subliminal priming have been 
investigated, like e.g. semantic priming (Kiefer, 2002; 
Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000) or priming of mental operations 
(Mattler, 2003). Here the prime-target relationship is 
not defined at the response level but regarding other 
prime-target aspects which are not necessarily used to 
specify the motor response. The scope of the current 
paper is restricted to subliminal response priming and 
does not elaborate on these other forms of priming.
Currently, the method of subliminal response prim-
ing is well-established and has become an often used 
method to investigate the influence of unconsciously 
seen stimuli (Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec`H, Koechlin, 
Mueller,  Dehaene-Lambertz,  van  de  Moortele,  &  Le 
Bihan, 1998; Dell’Aqua & Grainger, 1999; Greenwald, 
Draine,  &  Abrams,  1996;  Klotz  &  Neumann,  1999; 
Neumann  &  Klotz,  1994).  Accordingly,  research  in-
terest has shifted from establishing the phenomenon 
of  unconscious  priming  to  investigating  the  mecha-
nisms underlying this phenomenon (e.g., Ansorge & 
Heumann, 2003, 2006; Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 
2002;  Ansorge  &  Neumann,  2005;  Damian,  2001; 
Dehaene, et al., 1998; Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; 
Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Klinger, Burton, & 
Pitts, 2000; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003, 2005; 
Mattler, 2003; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004).
MEcHANISMS OF SUBLIMINAL  
RESPONSE PRIMING
Subliminally  presented  primes  usually  speed  up  re-
sponding to a subsequent target if they are assigned 
to the same rather than a different motor response. 
Now, the interesting question is: How do the primes 
work? Or which stages of the target processing are 
influenced by the prime? Basically, at least three dif-
ferent processing stages can be differentiated: Priming 
may influence target processing at perceptual, central, 
or response-related stages.
Perceptual processes
There are several findings that convincingly demon-
strate priming at perceptual stages: Firstly, masked 
primes  reduce  the  latency  of  detecting  the  subse-
quent  target  when  prime  and  target  are  presented 
at the same location. This perceptual latency priming 
presumably occurs because the prime initiates a shift 
of attention to its location and thereby facilitates per-
ceptual target processing (e.g. Scharlau, 2002, 2004; 
Scharlau  &  Ansorge,  2003;  Scharlau  &  Neumann, 
2003). 
Secondly, there is evidence that primes facilitate 
sensory processing of the target because addition-
ally  to  congruency  effects,  identical  prime-target 
pairs  have  been  shown  to  facilitate  responding. 
For example, Bodner and Dypvik (2005) instructed 
participants to categorize target numbers as being 
odd or even by pressing left or right response keys. 
Prior  to  the  target  number,  a  prime  number  was 
presented and masked to prevent conscious prime 
perception.  Primes  could  be  either  identical  (1-1, 
2-2, etc.), congruent (1-3, 2-4, etc.), or incongru-
ent  (1-4,  2-3,  etc.)  with  the  target.  Participants 
responded faster if primes were identical to, com-
pared to congruent or incongruent with, the targets 
(for  similar  results  see  Bodner  &  Masson,  1997; 
2003). Thus, primes speed up sensory processing 
of a subsequently presented identical target stimu-
lus.  Furthermore,  when  primes  and  targets  occur 
either as a number word or as an Arabic digit, re-
sponding is faster when the target is a perceptually 
identical repetition (e.g. 1 -> 1) rather than when 
prime  and  target  are  the  same  on  a  conceptual 
level  but  differ  in  their  peripheral  notation  (e.g.   
1 -> one; Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, Mechanisms of subliminal response priming
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1999). Obviously, perceptual prime-target similar-
ity facilitates target processing. 
 
central processes
Subliminal response priming also has been thought to 
be influenced by central processes (Greenwald et al., 
1996;  Marcel,  1980,  1983).  Within  this  framework, 
stimuli are supposed to be processed mandatorily up to 
a semantic level independently of whether they are pre-
sented consciously or unconsciously (as suggested in 
the late selection account of Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). 
A subliminally presented prime speeds up responding 
to the target because the prime automatically spreads 
activation in its semantic network. If the subsequently 
presented target stimulus belongs to the same seman-
tic network, the target is processed faster because of 
the pre-activation in the net (for a detailed description 
of the spreading activation account see Neely, 1991). 
Recently, the impact of spreading activation in sub-
liminal response priming has been seriously questioned 
by the observation that primes affected the processing 
of targets selectively regarding task-relevant features. 
For instance, Klinger et al. (2000) used affective word 
stimuli as primes and targets. Primes evoked congru-
ency effects when subjects categorized targets as be-
ing positive or negative. However, they had no impact 
on  target  processing  when  subjects  were  instructed 
to make a lexical decision (word vs. non-word). Thus, 
positive or negative primes are effective merely when 
targets are categorized according to their affective value, 
but not when a lexical decision is required. Within the 
same line of argumentation, there are quite a remark-
able number of studies demonstrating that priming is 
restricted to current task requirements (e.g. Ansorge et 
al., 2002; Bodner & Dypvik, 2005; Kunde et al., 2003; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004).
Thus, there are serious doubts as to whether se-
mantic  processing  of  subliminally  presented  stimuli 
and spreading activation in the semantic network is 
mandatory and therewith whether subliminal response 
priming is based on influences on central processing 
stages  (for  different  opinions  see  Klauer,  Musch,  & 
Eder, 2005; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005). On 
the contrary, prime processing seems to be determined 
by current task affordances and only information that 
is relevant for the required behavior has an impact in 
response priming studies.
Response processes
Subliminal primes have the power to eventually trig-
ger  motor  activation.  The  strongest  evidence  avail-
able comes from studies measuring LRP (lateralized 
readiness potentials). For example, Dehaene and col-
leagues reported that subliminal primes trigger LRPs, 
indicating  a  covert  activation  of  the  prime-related 
response  (Dehaene,  et  al.,  1998;  for  similar  obser-
vations  see  Eimer  &  Schlaghecken,  1998;  Leuthold 
& Kopp, 1998; Verleger et al., 2004). Pre-activation 
of  the  prime-related  response  facilitates  responding 
to the subsequently presented target stimulus if the 
target requires the same response as the prime. In 
contrast, if the target requires the opposite response, 
responding is slowed down because the inappropriate 
prime-induced response activation hinders it. Thus, it 
is widely accepted that subliminally presented stimuli 
prime motor responses. 
The question is, however, which processes are going 
on that enable the primes to trigger motor processes. 
Two extreme positions can be identified: The first one 
re-activates  the  idea  of  semantic  prime  processing 
and assumes that “unconscious primes activate mo-
tor  codes  through  semantics”  (Reynvoet,  Gevers,  & 
Caessens, 2005, p. 991). Thus, primes are submitted 
to  the  same  semantic  categorization  procedures  as 
conscious  targets.  And  only  after  being  categorized 
they  activate  the  category-assigned  motor  response 
(see also Dehaene et al., 1998). However, in contrast 
to  spreading  activation  accounts,  primes  influence 
target processing only if they belong to task-defined 
response categories. A mere semantic relatedness be-
tween prime and target does not suffice to influence 
target processing in a response priming paradigm.
Alternatively, it has been argued that the processing 
of unconscious stimuli is not elaborated. Instead, un-
conscious primes might activate responses by acquired 
S-R links between conscious target stimuli and motor 
responses. Later in the experiment, when a stimulus is 
shown as a subliminal prime that matches a stimulus 
one has already responded to, its associated response is 
retrieved (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001). 
This view denies the possibility of a deep analysis of 
unconscious stimuli and instead explains unconscious 
response priming by “simpler”, direct S-R links.
To decide between both accounts, one can consider 
whether stimuli that are never presented as targets 
(i.e. non-target primes) induce priming effects. It is 
not possible to acquire S-R mappings for primes that 
were never presented as targets. Thus, priming effects 
by non-target primes are crucial: If non-target primes 
remain ineffective despite their fit to the current task 
instructions, response priming is restricted to acquired 
S-R mappings. If, however, non-target primes cause 
response priming when they fit the current task con-310
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text, subliminally presented primes are analyzed ac-
cording to current task requirements. 
Unfortunately,  the  existing  evidence  is  contradic-
tory.  In  some  studies  only  target-primes,  but  not 
non-target  primes,  caused  congruency  effects  (e.g. 
Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001). In con-
trast, Naccache and Dehaene (2001) found that non-
target primes caused congruency effects to a similar 
extent as target-primes (see also Greenwald, Abrams, 
Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003). 
To  account  for  these  contradictory  results,  we 
suggest  a  two-process  model  that  will  be  described 
in detail in the following section. This model can be 
considered as an elaboration of the direct parameter 
specification  account  by  Neumann  (1990;  see  also 
Neumann  &  Klotz,  1994;  Klotz  &  Neumann,  1999). 
The  direct  parameter  specification  account  assumes 
that unconsciously registered information can specify 
an open parameter “if all parameters of the to-be-ex-
ecuted action have already been specified when the 
stimulus appears, except for those that will be speci-
fied by the stimulus itself” (Neumann & Klotz, 1994; 
p.  144).  That  is,  if  action  planning  has  occurred,  a 
subliminally presented prime stimulus can evoke mo-
tor responses by specifying the open parameter (e.g. 
performing a key press with left vs. right index finger) 
of a response. The aim of our model is to elaborate on 
how such a direct specification of parameters might 
work and under which circumstances it takes place. 
Action trigger account
Our  account  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  sub-
liminally  presented  stimuli  trigger  responses  neither 
because of semantic analysis nor because of acquired 
S-R  links.  Instead,  primes  trigger  responses  to  the 
extent  they  fit  existing  action  release  conditions, 
which we termed action triggers. In a first processing 
step, such action triggers are specified according to 
expected or experienced task demands. In this step, 
participants recollect memory representations of those 
environmental events that subsequently shall prompt 
a specific motor response (see Figure 1). Thus, partici-
pants categorize to-be-expected imperative stimuli in 
appropriate and non-appropriate release conditions for 
the task-defined response alternative. Online stimulus 
processing,  the  second  processing  step,  is  then  re-
stricted to comparing whether the incoming stimulus 
fits an existing action trigger. If a stimulus matches to 
the release conditions of an action trigger, the related 
action is automatically activated (causing congruency 
effects if the stimulus was a prime). 
To  illustrate  these  ideas,  consider  the  following   
example: Participants are instructed to categorize digits 
as being smaller or larger than five with the mapping left 
– smaller than 5 and right – larger than 5. The codes of 
the numerals 1, 2, 3 and 4 are then appropriate release 
conditions  for  pressing  a  left  response  key.  Of  course, 
representations of these numerals certainly encompass 
semantic information. For example, for the specific nu-
R
action trigger
S
R
action trigger
1.
2.
Figure 1.
Schematic illustration of the two stages proposed by the ac-
tion trigger account. Upper panel: Memory representations 
of those environmental events that shall prompt a specific 
motor response (1.) are recollected to specify action trig-
gers (2.). Lower panel: Online processing is restricted to 
comparing whether a stimulus fits existing action triggers. 
Stimuli that correspond to the release conditions automati-
cally trigger the related response.Mechanisms of subliminal response priming
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meral 4 this might be information such as “four is smaller 
than 5 but larger than 3”, “a car has four wheels”, “four 
persons are needed to play a quartet”. But representa-
tions of trigger events are also associated with specific 
perceptual information, such as “what does the 4 look 
like when written as an Arabic digit or when printed on a 
dice?” We conjecture that semantic features can be used 
to select an event as an action trigger, that is, semantic 
features can be used to specify the release conditions 
for a response. But for subsequent response activation, 
a match with early available perceptual features is im-
portant. Only stimuli that perceptually resemble release 
conditions trigger responses; semantic similarity does not 
induce motor activation.
Underlying this approach is the idea of task prepa-
ration: The ultimate reason to prepare for a task is 
to  bypass  some  of  the  slow  and  effortful  semantic 
operations  that  would  become  necessary  when  the 
event was encountered unexpectedly. In other words, 
a subsequent stimulus is processed to an extent that 
suffices to detect a match with an appropriate action 
trigger,  which  is  conceivably  detected  more  quickly 
when based on perceptual rather than semantic fea-
tures (for similar ideas see Ach, 1905; Bargh, 1989; 
Exner, 1879; Hommel, 2000; Neumann, 1990). 
The action trigger approach allows for a considerable 
degree of flexibility regarding the origin of response 
priming  effects.  In  fact,  this  approach  more  or  less 
includes features of all the other accounts reviewed 
before.  It  includes  perceptual  facilitation.  However, 
what counts is not the perceptual match of primes and 
subsequent targets but the perceptual match of primes 
with pre-specified trigger conditions. It also includes 
semantic  processing.  However,  semantic  process-
ing is assumed to occur offline when environmental 
events are specified as adequate release conditions. 
Additionally, of course it assumes response activation 
which occurs if stimuli fit the release conditions of the 
action trigger. The entire idea of action triggers (and 
several  comparable  ideas  in  cognitive  psychology) 
bears on the need to enable prompt responding in a 
more or less predictable environment. This approach 
might appear as eclectic or vague, but we believe that 
such an eclectic approach is indeed needed to explain 
the  contradictory  evidence  on  unconscious  priming, 
that other accounts alone, fail to explain. 
transfer of priming to unseen 
stimuli 
As  noted  above,  it  seems  particularly  important  to 
clarify when priming transfers to unseen stimuli and 
when it does not. According to the action trigger ap-
proach such a transfer of priming has its origins in the 
specification of action triggers. A transfer occurs if this 
stimulus event is considered as an action trigger. How 
can an event that is not experienced as a target become 
an  action  trigger?  This  might  happen  if  it  is  closely 
related to the stimuli that are recollected as trigger 
events because they are experienced as stimuli. Thus, 
transfer of priming to unseen stimuli may occur due to 
semantic relatedness between primes and targets, but 
it is not the prime that semantically pre-activates the 
target. Instead, the seen targets lead to an inclusion of 
unseen stimulus events in the set of action triggers. 
The  action  trigger  approach  may  account  for  the 
observation  of  non-target  priming  by  Naccache  and 
Dehaene  (2001).  Consider  that  participants  had  to 
judge whether digits are smaller or larger than 5, and 
in the experiments faced the numbers 1, 4, 6, and 9. 
In these conditions the numbers 1 and 4 become se-
lected as action triggers for the left response and the 
numbers 6 and 9 become selected as action triggers 
for the right response. All we know about the mental 
representation of numbers tells us that they form an 
intimately integrated representation that is often de-
scribed as a mental number line (Galton, 1880; Göbel, 
Walsh, & Rushworth, 2001). If now the numbers 1 and 
4 have become selected as triggers for a left response, 
it seems likely that the mentally enclosed numbers 2 
and 3 might enter the same trigger set when there is 
no obvious harm in doing so. If this “incidental recol-
lection” account is correct, it should be less likely that 
unseen stimuli become considered as action triggers 
when the semantic distance to the experienced trigger 
events is larger. This seems to be so. When the digits 
3 and 4 are used as targets (and selected as action 
triggers) the neighboring, but not enclosed, numbers 
1 and 2 exert essentially no priming effect (Kunde et 
al., 2003, Exp. 2).
Conceivably,  a  recollection  as  action  trigger  is 
less likely, the less closely the mental presentations 
of  these  events  are  related  to  experienced  trigger 
events.  Therefore,  it  is  presumably  much  harder  to 
obtain transfer of priming for stimuli that share a more 
arbitrary criterion (like pleasantness in the study of 
Abrams & Greenwald, 2000, or size in the study of 
Damian, 2001) than for digit stimuli that are tightly 
related. To explore this issue we conducted a study 
where the participants judged whether the object de-
noted by a target word was smaller or larger than a 
football.  Obviously,  the  number  of  potential  objects 
smaller or larger than a football is quite large and they 
might be associated to each other on an almost infinite 312
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number of semantic dimensions (such as evaluative 
content, being animate, size, etc.). Thus, an activa-
tion of a concept that is somehow linked to a target 
word seems much less likely than in the case of the 
tight-knit numbers. In fact, with an analogue version 
of the number experiment reported above with only 
four target words we found no spread of priming to 
unseen stimuli. Yet, when the number of consciously 
encountered targets increased to forty words, there 
was a transfer of priming to novel prime words (Kiesel, 
Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006). We conjecture that 
with such a large set of target words the participants 
consider other words as potential targets as well. For 
example, after having experienced the words “knife”, 
“mug”  and  “cup”  it  seems  possible  that  the  word 
“spoon” becomes recollected as well, either because 
participants are intentionally expecting this word, or 
because the preceding target words activated codes 
of this word as well. By contrast, there is no reason 
to intentionally prepare for other words after it has 
become clear that only four words are used as targets, 
and also a collateral activation from these target words 
to other unseen words is unlikely. Thus, this finding is 
in line with the studies of Damian (2001) and Abrams 
and Greenwald (2000). In those cases no congruency 
effects  for  non-target  primes  were  observed  while 
small target sets, consisting of 12 and 16 exemplars 
respectively, were used. 
The  action  trigger  approach  can  account  for   
hitherto  contradictory  evidence  on  unconscious 
priming.  Additionally,  it  enables  a  further  predic-
tion: Transfer to unseen stimuli should be restricted 
to exemplars of stimuli that are related to the tar-
gets. Conversely, no further transfer, for example 
to non-experienced notations, would be predicted. 
Action triggers are assumed to be set up in a way 
that allows an easy check on whether stimuli match 
the release conditions based on early available fea-
tures. There is no reason to build up action triggers 
for  notations  that  were  never  experienced.  Given 
that  primes  are  not  processed  semantically,  but 
just according to whether they match the release 
condition, priming should be restricted to experi-
enced target notations. Such a result was observed 
when participants categorized digit stimuli as being 
smaller or larger than 5 (Kunde, et al., 2003, Exp. 
4). Targets were the numbers 1, 4, 6 and 9, which 
were  presented  in  Arabic  notation  for  one  group 
of  participants  and  as  number  words  for  another 
group of participants. Priming transferred to unseen 
stimuli in the experienced notation, but there was 
no transfer to those in the alternative notation.
IMPLIcAtIONS FOR tHE StUDY  
OF cONScIOUSNESS
When investigating how unconscious stimuli are proc-
essed, there is an admittedly very ambitious goal: By 
elaborating the possibilities and boundaries of uncon-
scious stimulus processing, we hope to draw conclu-
sions about the functionality of consciousness. Cases 
in which subliminally presented stimuli remain ineffec-
tive are of special interest because they demonstrate 
the functionality of consciousness. 
Evidence discussed in the current paper shows that 
regarding the processing stages for stimuli, conscious-
ness is clearly not necessary to speed up perceptual 
processes and it is also not necessary to activate motor 
processes. In contrast, within experimental conditions 
when investigating response priming access to more 
abstract memory codes, semantic processing seems 
to be restricted to consciously presented stimuli (for 
similar conclusions see Holender & Duscherer, 2004).
For future research it is a challenge to identify more 
processes that are restricted to conscious stimuli. For 
example, higher order processes like executive func-
tions might be bound to consciousness. Initial evidence 
in this direction was brought forward by Kunde (2003). 
He explored whether participants adapt to conflict that 
was  induced  by  subliminally  and  supraliminally  pre-
sented prime stimuli. Conflict adaptation was restrict-
ed to cases where conflict was evoked by supraliminal 
stimuli. Subliminally presented stimuli evoked conflict 
by means of response congruency effect, but partici-
pants did not adapt to this subliminally evoked conflict. 
At first glance, the results of Jaśkowski, Skalska and 
Verleger (2003) might contradict this conclusion. They 
observed that the effect size of subliminal response 
priming depended on the ratio of incongruent and con-
gruent prime stimuli. Priming effects were weaker if 
incongruent primes were presented more frequently 
than congruent primes. However, to account for this 
finding,  they  do  not  assume  a  conflict  adaptation 
mechanism evoked by subliminally presented stimuli. 
Instead, they propose that the openly observable er-
ror frequency (which is higher if incongruent primes 
are presented more often) causes participants to act 
more  cautiously  and  to  prevent  unconscious  prime 
processing. Thus, their reasoning is completely in line 
with  the  assumption  that  offline  control  determines 
whether  and  to  what  degree  subliminally  presented 
primes become effective. Also, it does not contradict 
the  assumption  that  consciousness  is  a  prerequisite 
for executive control processes (see also Mayr, 2004; 
McCormick, 1997). However, future research is needed Mechanisms of subliminal response priming
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to clarify the necessity of consciousness on executive 
functions.
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